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COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM

authorization in cases involving internal union disputes than in cases where a
union is sued by an outside party. This distinction would seem to rest on sheer and
transparent policy, however, and, it is to be hoped, will not be relied upon.
The Court's decision is a welcome stride forward from the position that
union is not liable except as all of its members are. Even if provisions in the
General Associations Law are purely procedural, there is no reason why the
substantive law of associations cannot develop in pace with changing societal
conditions, rather than continue to sustain a rule of law " . . . for no better
reason ... than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. ' 38

Application of Statute to Employer and Domestic
Section 240 of the Labor Law imposes a duty upon employers of persons
employed to, inter alia, clean buildings and structures, to furnish safe equipment

for such work, including scaffolding, ladders, etc. A domestic who, while cleaning
windows on a private dwelling, fell from a ladder and injured herself, attempted to
hold the householder liable for the injuries because of an alleged violation of this
section. The Court rejected the claim, however, holding that section 240 was not
intended by the legislature to apply to such a situation but only to circumstances
where cleaning is incidental to "building construction, demolition and repair
work." The section is an integral part of the article of the Labor Law dealing
with that subject and obviously was not meant to reach the controversy at issue.39

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Zoning-Constitutionality of Ordinance Discontinuing Non-Conforming Uses
The petitioner in Harbison v. City of Buffalo' operated a drum reconditioning plant on his own property in the city of Buffalo. He erected the building
thereon shortly after purchasing the property in 1924. At that time there were
located nearby a glue factory and a city owned dump. The area was unzoned at
the time, but in 1926 it was zoned for residential use and has remained so zoned,
with the exception of one short period, to the present time. From 1936 to 1956,
Harbison applied for and received licenses to conduct business as a junk dealer,
a classification which embraced drum reconditioners. In 1956, the petitioner
was refused a junk dealer's license and a drum reconditioning license pursuant
to a city ordinance passed in 1953, which provided for a cessation of certain
nonconforming uses, including "any junk-yard", within two years of the date of
38. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAIv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
39. Connors v. Boorstein, 4 N.Y.2d 172, 173 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1958).
1.

4 N.Y.2d 553, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958).
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the ordinance.2 Upon the refusal of the director of licenses for the city of Buffalo
to issue a license, petitioner instituted a mandamus proceeding-" for the purpose
of acquiring a license.
The majority reversed the Appellate Division, 4 which had approved with
modification the order of Special Term directing the issuance of a license, and
remanded the matter to Special Term to determine whether the ordinance as
imposed in this particular situation would cause a harm so subst intial as to bc
unconstitutional. Two judges concurred in this opinion, and twc concurred in
the result upon the principle of People v. Miller, which held that a zoning regulation could be enforced against a prior non-conforming use where the resulting
loss was slight and unsubstantial. 6 The regulation upheld in the Miller Case
forced the defendant to cease harboring pigeons which he kept as a hobby, an
inconsequential use in the eyes of the Court of Appeals.
There is a considerable lack of unanimity on the question of termination
of nonconforming uses existing before the enactment of the ordinance. The
policy of zoning laws is the gradual elimination of nonconforming uses, including
the elimination of nonconforming pre-existing uses by specifying a reasonable
time within which they must conform.7 Based on the cases discussed below it
is the opinion of one text writer that such ordinances are valid and constitutional."
A plumbing establishment was forced to move after the five years maximum
time allowed for conforming by ordinance, deipite an estimated cost of $5,000.0
The court in that case felt it only a matter of degree between the valid exercise
of police power in restricting future use and termination of existing uses within
a reasonable time period. A gas station has succumbed to the same type of ordinance with a ten year limitation. 10 Two Louisiana cases represent the most
extreme position taken by the courts, allowing the removal of a grocery store
and a drug store within one year," These cases are based on the assumption
that there will be no loss to property owners if the time alloted for discontinuing
the use is reasonable. This is, in essence, the theory of amortization, which can
be stated simply as a termination of the nonconforming use at the end of the
2. BuFFALo, N. Y. ORDINANCES ch. LXX, ch. 18 §1, July 30, 1953.
3. N. Y. Civ. PR~c. AcT §78.
4. Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 A.D.2d 999, 169 N.Y.S.2d 598 (4th Dep't
1957).
5. 304 N.Y. 105, 106 N.E.2d 34 (1952).
6. Id. at 108, 35.
7. 2 RATHKOPF, THIE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 80 (3d ed. 1956).
8. Ibid.
9. City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P 2d 34 (1954).
10. Standard Oil Co v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950),
cert. denied 340 U.S. 892 (1950).
11. State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 13 S. 314 (1929);

State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 S. 613 (1929), cert.
denied 280 U.S. 556 (1929). These cases held violation of a zoning ordinance to
be a nuisance.
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useful life of the pre-existing nonconforming use. Losses, if any, are spread out
over a period of years and the property owner has the benefit of a limited monopoly until that time.' 2 Although the theory that the value of the property can
be amortized over a reasonable period may seem a desirable basis for the elimination of nonconforming pre-existing uses, its use has been infrequent.' 3 The
difficulty of applying the theory is evidenced by the variation in results as noted
above. The most serious problem is yet to be solved, that is how to get a workable, fafr, and consistent measure of useful life.
New York has held that where zoning ordinances are passed during any
period of construction of a building the property owner has a right to complete
the building,' 4 and if the building be already complete when the ordinance is
passed, he need not cease his nonconforming use.15 The court has sanctioned
ordinances which prohibit enlarging a nonconforming use.1 6 The next step was
the concept developed in the Miller case that reasonable termination of nonconforming uses is allowable if the loss to the property owner is slight and
unsubstantial. The court is applying the test laid down in the Miller case held
that an ordinance requiring the cessation of a sand and gravel business was un7
constitutional.'
The opinion in the case is based on a balancing of the public good against
the loss to the property owner; a zoning ordinance that requires the termination
of prior non-conforming structures or uses is not unconstitutional, if the period
allowed for termination is a reasonable time during which the owner may
amortize his investment and adjust his plans for the future. Whether or not
the time allowed for amortization is reasonable depends upon the facts in eath
case.

The dissent takes the view, in an elaborate and persuasive opinion, that there
is no justification for the substitution of zoning regulations for the law of nuisance
and eminent domain on the ground that the loss suffered by the property owner
is slight. The opinion of the dissent can be deemed a caveat to be considered
carefully by any court applying the law established by this case.
12. Comment, 1951 Wis. L. Rev. 685, 692; Comment, 35 Va. L. Rev. 348, 357
((1949).
13. Comment, 102 U.Pa. L. Rev. 91, 101 (1953).
14. City of Buffalo v. Chadeayne, 134 N.Y. 163, 41 N.E. 443 (1892).
15. 440 East 102d Street Corporation v. Murdock, 285 N.Y. 298, 34 N.E. 2d
329 (1941).
16. Koeber v. Bedell, 280 N.Y. 692, 21 N.E.2d 200 (1939); Marcus v. Village
of Mamaroneck, 283 N.Y. 325, 28 N.E.2d 856 (1940).
17. Town of Somers v. Camarco, 308 N.Y. 537, 127 N.E.2d 327 (1955).

